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1 INTRODUCTION'
Aid to support good government in principle has
two faces. The less attractive face is that of political
conditionality: the tying of aid commitments to the
behaviour of recipient governments in relation to
such issues as holding elections, respecting human
rights or tackling corruption. The more benign face
is that of 'positive support': donor funding for
projects and programmes expressly designed to
promote better governance. The prospect of such
'positive' aid is one factor that makes the good
government agenda tolerable to aid recipients.
I argue here that, even if donors can find the money,
the prospects for large scale 'positive' support for
good government are less good than many would
hope, because aid agencies will find it difficult to
implement good government projects effectively.
The general reasons are that:
(j) Positive support to better government requires
aid agencies mainly to engage in what are con-
ventionally called 'institutional development', or
'institution building' activities.
(ii) As a great deal of experience shows, institution
building activities are problematic for aid agencies.
I identify and discuss four distinct sets of problems
with aid projects for institution building:
(j) Aid agencies have a long experience of support-
ing institutional development activities. According
to their own evaluations, their records of achieve-
ment are not very impressive. The causes of mediocre
performance are not easily remedied. Aid agencies
may become better institution builders in the future
than they have in the past, but it seems unlikely
that they will become paragons in the art.
(ii) Institution building activities have in the past
been heavily supported with technical assistance.
Yet there is something of a crisis in the technical
The ideas in this paper derive largely from work on aid and
institutional development for the Swedish International Aid Agency
(SIDA), and are explored in more detail in SIDA (1994).
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assistance field: conventional methods of delivering
technical assistance have recently been authorita-
tively discredited, yet alternatives are not readily
available.
There has always been considerably uncertainty
and disagreement about the meaning of 'institu-
tional development'. This has not been a major
problem, but now threatens to be because some
(multilateral) aid agencies are beginning to replace
it with an even more vague termcapacity build-
ing - in such an undiscriminating and confusing
way as to stimulate debate and dissent. Ideas mat-
ter. It is difficult to obtain the commitment of
professional staff to a set of activities if they are not
reasonably clear about what it is they are asked to
do, and confident that there is a defensible intellec-
tual justification for it.
The successful promotion of institution building
may require aid agency staff to intervene directly in
the internal affairs of recipient nations. This is quite
consistent with the good government agenda in
general, which at its broadest symbolizes and
institutionalizes a greater and more transparent
exercise of influence by aid donors over the 'inter-
nal' affairs of recipient nations. The problem for aid
agencies themselves is whether they have the
capacity to intervene effectively.
2 POSITIVE AID FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT
Positive support for good government could involve
a very wide range of types of projects, intended to
develop or improve the capacity of any of the
following kinds of institutions or organizations:
state administrative machinery in general; state
policymaking units; political parties; human rights
organizations; civil society organizations; legi-
slative institutions; electoral institutions; judicial
institutions; the police; the mass media.
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In some cases, aid may take the form of the supply
of equipment and other physical facilities. Customs
officials may need fast patrol boats to intercept
narcotics smugglers, and Elections Commissioners
may need buildings and computers. In a few cases,
aid may be of a short term nature: such as emergency
assistance to organize polling in a country with no
tradition of holding free elections. But in most cases,
positive assistance will be of a long term nature, and
intended to help improve the general capacity of
particular organizations or institutions. It will be
what is generally termed 'institution building'.
Perverse as it may seem, it is less confusing if I
postpone discussion of the meaning of 'institution
building', and begin by discussing aid agencies'
experiences in the field.
3 THE EXPERIENCE OF INSTITUTION
BUILDING IN AID PROJECTS
A recurrent theme in the literature on aid and
institution building is that aid agencies are not very
good at this particular job, and certainly less good at
it than projects with larger hardware components.
There is, in fact, some rather convincing evidence in
support of these arguments from aid agencies
themselves:
(j) The World Bank's reviews of its own projects,
divided into 'institutional development' and 'physi-
cal' activities, 'have consistently arrived at the
conclusion that the physical components of pro-
grams have been successful about twice as often as
have institutional development components' (Israel
1987: 2).
A study of evaluations of recent USAID projects
completed in 1985 and 1986 found that 40 per cent
of projects had received a strongly negative rating
in relation to their contribution to improving insti-
tutional capacity (Kean et al. 1988).
A study of recent British aid projects with
institution building components involved looking
at five projects in depth, 15 Evaluation Summaries,
and 50 Project Completion Reports. Each data set
indicated that the institution building components
Z (Leonard, 1987) classifies managerial functions into four cate-
gories in terms of their contribution to project success - public
policymaking, organizational leadership, internal administration
and 'bureaucratic hygiene' - and argues that the latter, which is
the least important, is the one of greatest concern to aid agencies
in relation to the projects that they fund.
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had been less successful than the other components
(Austin 1993: 11-27).
There is a conventional argument for these findings
that has two main components, each relating to the
character of the aid agencies themselves. One com-
ponent is that aid agencies operate as bureaucrac-
ies in the pejorative sense of the term: they are
relatively rigid and inflexible in approach, operate
in a 'blueprint' rather than a 'process' mode, prefer
standard formulas and approaches, are focused on
achieving the main goals by which they are judged,
i.e. spending large quantities of money in the short
term, and therefore only pay serious attention to
large scale activities.2 All these characteristics are
inimical to effective institution (and organization)
building, which requires a different approach:
patience and a long time horizon; experimentation
and willingness to admit and learn from mistakes;
human skills and sensitivity rather than expensive
hardware; and sensitivity to the particular cultural
and political environment into which the institution
is to fit( Van Reenen and Waisfisz 1988). The second
component of the conventional argument is that
aid agencies perform all the worse in these respects
because they are not only bureaucracies, but foreign
bureaucracies with limited understanding of, com-
munication with, or empathy for the environment
in which they operate - and often handicapped
by high staff turnover rates of field staff(Diallo 1991;
Edgcomb and Cawley 1991).
There is certainly some truth in these conventional
arguments. But it is unlikely that they provide an
adequate explanation for the facts. There are two
further reasons, stemming not from the character of
aid agencies, but from the nature of institution
building itself:
(i) Institution building is a 'low specificity activity'
in Israel's terms (1987). Low specificity activities
are relatively imprecisely defined, and lack the
feedback mechanisms that help identify or reverse
poor task performance in a quasi-automatic way:
relatively intense and immediate adverse effects
that affect a wide range of influential people in a
direct fashion.3 Everything else being equal, low
specificity activities tend to be performed poorly.
Israel uses as a paradigm of a high specificity task the
maintenance of aircraft engines. The work process is specified in
great detail, and, should the job be done badly and the aircraft
develop a fault or crash, there are powerful, quasi-au tomatic
feedback mechanisms for detecting the source of the problem.
Institution building is a low specificity activity
because we have no very well developed idea of
how institution building is best achieved, no stand-
ard work plans that those responsible for projects
should follow, no precise techniques for measuring
progress, and no automatic mechanisms through
which failures or poor performance will have a
major, intense or immediate impact, and stimulate
investigation and corrective action. Agents charged
with achieving institution building who are doing a
poor job, whether knowingly or unknowingly, will
tend not to be held responsible; excuses can always
be found for poor results.
(ii) The 'hardware' components of aid projects tend
to be completed with relative speed and enthusiasm
because there are either suppliers or contractors
who have a clear interest in progress and capacity
to bring influence to bear. Such influences may
not always have a benign effect on the quality of
work, but they do tend to encourage completion.
By contrast, projects lacking major 'hardware' com-
ponents - i.e. most institution building projects -
tend not to enjoy this kind of political support, and
are less likely to be given attention and priority by
decision makers (Tendler 1982).
Institution building is doubly difficult for aid
agencies: first because they are aid agencies, and
second because the task itself is difficult. Unfortu-
nately, there are no clear or simple solutions.
4 TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING
Technical cooperation is in principle distinct from
institution building. Yet the two have often been
treated as near-equivalents in the discourse of aid
agencies: the prime purpose of technical coopera-
tion is believed to be institution building, and the
aid donors' main contribution to institution build-
ing is believed to be through financing technical
cooperation. The futures of technical cooperation
and institution building are linked; and the future
lt does no harm to repeat the old definition of 'expert': an 'ex' is
a 'has been'; and a 'spert' (spurt) is a drip under pressure.
The most influential critique is likely to be (Berg 1993) partly
because it emanates from the UN agency with the strongest vested
interests in 'old-style' technical cooperation, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). Not all expert-counterpart
relationships have failed. In general, they have been relatively
successful in activities which (a) have limited institution building
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of technical cooperation is currently seen as very
problematic.
The dominant and most expensive component of
conventional technical cooperation is the 'individual
expert-counterpart relationship': the arrangements
by which individually-recruited 'experts'4, mainly
from the donor countries, occupied posts in devel-
oping countries at international salary levels for
fixed periods of a few years, during which they were
required both to do a particular job and train the
local 'counterparts' to whom they were attached.
The expert-counterpart model, has come in for a
great deal of authoritative criticism lately. Recent
reports have placed the official stamp of approval
on what has been widely known for years: that such
arrangements are extremely expensive; that there is
little evidence that they are generally effective in the
training function; and that they generate adverse
effects as a result of the enormous differences in
remuneration levels between the experts and the
local people with whom they are expected to work.5
The fundamental criticism of the expert-counterpart
model has led to increased attention on the only
alternative general model of technical cooperation:
long-term 'twinning' arrangements between organi-
zations in developing countries and 'counterpart'
organizations in donor countries. The idea is far
from new: it has long been practised in commercial
activities, notably in arrangements between estab-
lished and new or weak airline companies. This is
however a new activity for aid agencies; experience
is therefore very limited. It is questionable whether
'twinning' can meet the expectations which it is
now generating (Berg 1993: 116-120; Cooper 1984).
In principle the arrangement has several advan-
tages: the greater credibility and acceptance of the
'donor-side' personnel in the recipient country be-
cause they come as fellow professionals with similar
problems; flexibility in the type of assistance to be
provided and in the timing; the scope for a variety
of types of inter-personal interaction; and the
possibility of long-term relationships. There are,
dimensions and (b) involve the transfer of scientific and engineer-
ing knowledge, especially the kinds of knowledge, like most
mechanical engineering, which is robust over a wide range of
physical environments (Muscat 1986). Unfortunately however,
the growth in technical cooperation in the region that is most
deeply problematic - sub-Saharan Africa - has been concentrated
precisely in the 'softer' areas - institution building and project-
related training - in which the record is poor (Havnevïk 1992).
however, a number of actual and potential problems
with such arrangements: potential donor-side sup-
plier organizations may be limited in number,
especially in small donor nations; they may be
inappropriate, especially if they engage in a diverse
range of activities in addition to those performed by
the recipient organization. It is difficult to draw up
a contract to regulate the relationship, and dis-
agreements and misunderstandings may easily arise;
and the costs, in time and effort, as well as finance,
in establishing twinning arrangements are often
high. Successful twinning may require the skills
of a matchmaker.
New potential First World twinning partners will
emerge. In particular, local governments in several
aid donor countries see the potential, and are offer-
ing 'technical twinning' arrangements with local
governments in recipient countries to supplement
the established 'cultural twinning' arrangements
between towns and cities across national frontiers.
The usefulness of this 'technical twinning' system
has, however, yet to be proven. More generally,
the dominant problems are that the supply of effec-
tive counterpart institutions in donor countries is
very small and cannot be expanded rapidly; and
the demand for such relationships is growing fast
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
as well as in the 'traditional' aid receiving countries.
The institutional capacity in donor countries to
deliver institution building services effectively
through any technical cooperation mechanism
appears very limited.
5 WHAT IS INSTITUTION BUILDING? MEANING
AND MORALE
If the definition of 'institution building' (or 'institu-
tional development') is problematic, why not deal
with this at the beginning of the article, before going
into detail? The short answer is that definitional
issues are only now becoming problematic in prac-
tice. Although there has always been debate and
wide disagreement among academics about de-
finitions, this has not impeded practitioners: they
have gone ahead with an implicit definition of 'insti-
tution building' that has proved quite serviceable.
Definitional disputes have not impeded action. This
fortunate circumstance is however now under threat:
the process of re-equipping the aid bureaucracies
with a new jargon to deal with the good government
agenda has generated a new term, 'capacity build-
ing', that is likely to spawn confusing controversy
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and undermine the morale of aid agency staff con-
cerned with institution building by weakening their
sense of working to a clear mission. The purpose of
this section is briefly to explain this argument.
Let us take first the definitional question. There is
a large academic literature, much disagreement,
and no sign of greater convergence than there was
when the issues were first debated in a major way in
the 1950s. It is conventional to begin by trying to
define 'institution'. Here the English language and
sociological theory combine to provide a wealth of
alternative definitions, most of them so abstract that
few of us would be able confidently to recognize an
'institution' in the street. For example, some recent
definitions of 'institution' include: 'routines or
standardized solutions to collective problems'(Gold-
smith 1992: 582); and 'sets of formal and informal
rules' (Schiavo-Campo 1994), while some of the
original theorists of Third World institution build-
ing have seen institutions as organizations that are
'change-inducing, change-protecting, and formal'
(Esman, quoted in Blase 1973: 1/5-1/6).
I have no expectations of resolving these disputes,
here or elsewhere. Goldsmith points out that there
are two very different academic traditions using
different definitions and talking past each other:
Behind the confusion is the fact that the term
institution has two principal meanings in social
science. In management and organization theory,
an institution usually refers to a role or organiza-
tion; in economic and sociology, an institution is
a rule or a convention. There are major diver-
gences between these two definitions The
first type of institution resides in deliberately
constructed human groupings, the second is dif-
fused among a multitude of people. Roles have
concrete reality, rules are mental conceptions.
(Goldsmith 1992: 582)
According to the first definition, a court system is an
institution; according to the second, it is the 'rule of
law' that qualifies for the title.
This disagreement is not purely intellectual: differ-
ent definitions suit different purposes. The 'role'
definition has been appropriate to justify the great
bulk of the aid activities that have actually been
conducted under the 'institution building' label:
support to specific organizations - government
offices, universities, training colleges - to build
them up and make them more effective. By contrast,
the 'rule' definition is very attractive to econo-
mists (and others) whose main concerns are with
the ex-socialist countries. They define the problem
in terms of patterns of behaviour, and the lack of
('rules') institutions of law, contract, property rights
and similar issues. They are more concerned to
change behaviour than to build specific organiza-
tions. It is their definition that at present has the
upper hand in academia.
What about the aid agencies? They have fed this
debate by commissioning many studies of institu-
tion building, but appear not to have been too much
affected by the intellectual confusion that these
studies have revealed and stimulated. The most
cynical definition may be the most useful: in aid
agency practice, institution building is 'a leftover
category for everything in foreign assistance that
is neither financial nor economic' (Goldsmith 1992:
584).6 Put in a more positive light, institution
building has mainly comprised attempts to develop
and improve the functioning of specific organiza-
tions - government agencies, education and train-
ing institutions, NGOs, etc. - by providing finance,
buildings, equipment, staff training, or the services
of technical assistance personnel. It also comprises
a range of other miscellaneous activities that are
directly oriented to human behaviour and interac-
tion, rather than to finance or material provision
(e.g. support for workshops and meetings of
various kinds).
If the story were complete at this point, there would
be no great cause for concern. One could certainly
poke a little fun at aid agencies für their inability to
produce a very coherent analysis of what they
were intending to achieve under the label of institu-
tion building. But they could carry on doing it
without worrying overmuch about whether they
were not completely at sea. This may cease to be
the case as a result of the attempt by a number of
(mainly UN and multilateral) agencies to 're-
position' themselves to take advantage of the good
government agenda by claiming competence in
'capacity building'. What is 'capacity building'?
That is the problem. It includes everything that was
covered by the different definitions of 'institution
building', and much more besides. Compared with
Aid agencies could not of course admit to such pragmatism: it
would amount to a confession of uncertainty about objectives that
is not tolerable in publicly-funded organizations that are in principle
highly mission-driven.
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'capacity building', the concept of 'institution build-
ing' is highly precise. 'Capacity building' is used 'to
describe the capacities of nations, communities,
groups, and citizens to promote development
objectives and solve their own problems' (Cohen
1993: 1). In other words, the term becomes practi-
cally and analytically useless, because it tries to
include everything:
a 1992 UNDP study illustrates the analytical
confusion that typifies current use of the con-
cept. Specifically, after distinguishing three ill-
defined components of capacity (education and
training, organizations, and development cul-
ture), the study proceeds to specify six diverse
and inconsistent types of capacity building:
macroeconomic policy management (a
specific managerial or professional skill);
professional education (a training task);
public services reform (a structural and
legal change);
private sector (an untargeted sector wide
focus);
popular participation in choice of national
goals and means (a political objective); and
national development culture (a vague and
social system wide focus).
(Cohen 1993: 2)
The concept of 'capacity building' may serve to re-
finance some development bureaucracies whose
existence is otherwise in question, and to advance
the careers of some bureaucratic entrepreneurs. It
will not help those responsible for making good use
of aid money, and may indeed make their task
more difficult. For ideas do matter, especially to
professional people. And effective aid agencies - as
opposed to large swathes of the multilateral aid
bureaucracies - depend on committed professionals
to define and implement their programmes. It is
hard to see how commitment can be forthcoming
from people working in institution building if the
latest fashion for 'capacity building' leads to end-
less debate and dispute, and succeeds in making
clearand public an aspect of the good government
agenda that has hitherto remained latent: the
fact that talk of 'institutional failure' in developing
countries comes perilously close to an admission
that there is some fundamental problem that we
can neither understand nor effectively confront,
but simply label.
6 INTERVENTIONISM AND INSTITUTION
BUILDING
Intervention by wealthy and poorer countries in the
internal affairs of poorer and weaker countries is
not new. It has taken place as long as states have
existed. Neither is the use of development aid as a
tool and justification for intervention a new experi-
ence: the fundamental motivation for development
aid as we now understand the term was Cold War
competition for political support in the Third World.
Aid often became very political. There was however
always a basic tension between the power in-
equality embedded in the aid relationship and the
language in which this relationship was publicly
presented: the parties generally adhered to the
fiction that aid recipients were full and equal mem-
bers of the international system of states, and that
the giving and receiving of aid was a voluntary
and equal transaction between sovereign states,
equivalent to a cultural exchange agreement or a
trade treaty (Jackson 1990).
The latter fiction has been considerably weakened
since the emergence of the good government
agenda around 1990, and for non-coincidental rea-
sons. At the ideological level, the emphasis placed
by donors on the inadequacy of the governance
arrangements of aid recipients comes close to a
denial of the assumption of the fundamentally equal
status of all states in the international state system.
The notion of the inferior political status of the
governments of aid recipient countries may be
expressed in terms of lack of political legitimacy,
poor management of public and aid resources, or
inability to meet what used to be a key criterion of
stateness - capacity to rule the population over
which control is claimed. However articulated in
particular cases, it has now become acceptable, within
donor nations, to talk and justify direct interven-
tions in terms of the political inadequacy of Third
World states. Direct interventions range from ex-
plicit political conditionality - tying aid to changes
in the constitution of governments - to actual mili-
tary intervention, as in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda
and Haiti. Interventionism and the push by aid
donors for 'good government' in recipient countries
go together.
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What does all this have to do with 'positive aid for
good government'? Surely the whole point of that
is to find ways of directly supporting the emergence
of better government that are separate from, and
not tied up with, the 'conditionality agenda'? That
is certainly a laudable objective for those of us who
still believe in the humanitarian ideals that motivate
publics in rich countries to support aid giving.
Unfortunately, it may be very difficult for aid
agencies effectively to support institution building
in developing countries without engaging in a
more vigorous interventionism of their own that is
not easily separable from the more general interven-
tionism that characterizes the relationship between
rich and poor nations. To explain that point, we
have to step back a little and look at the evolution of
ideas about the causes of good organizational
performance, especially but not only in developing
countries.
7 UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
There is a simple but very useful dichotomy be-
tween two basic approaches to the issue of improv-
ing the performance of organizations. This can be
expressed in terms of the economists' distinction
between supply and demand. 'Supply' approaches
focus on the adequacy of resources: does the
Department of X have enough money, (qualified
and experienced) staff, buildings, equipment, and
knowledge to do its job? If not, the answer is to
provide the missing resources. The 'supply' ap-
proach has dominated aid agencies' attempts to
promote institution building in developing coun-
tries. 'Demand' approaches focus less on the
organization itself than its environment: what are
the features of this environment that will encourage
the (management and staff of) the organization to
strive to do a good job, and make good use of the
resources they have available?
'Demand' approaches are diverse. They are also
increasingly popular. There is a widespread view,
well reflected in a range of academic literature,
that 'supply' approaches have in the past been
given too much emphasis, and that more attention
needs to be paid to 'demand' approaches. If one
were to attempt to market this idea, an appropriate
slogan would be: 'Encouraging organizations to
help themselves'.
In the industrialized countries, demand-based ap-
proaches have been institutionalized in the public
sector through the introduction, especially in the
Anglophone countries during the 1980s, of a set of
practices conventionally labelled the New Public
Management (NPM). The central feature of NPM
is the attempt to introduce or simulate, within those
sections of the public service that are not privatized,
the performance incentives and disciplines which
exist in a market environment: clear separation
between 'implementing agencies' and policymaking
and supervisory Ministries, as the organizational
basis for the rigorous calculation of service deliv-
ery costs and enforcement of 'value-for-money'
principles; contracting out of service delivery to the
private sector; competitive tendering for service
delivery contracts among implementing agencies,
public or private; devolution of power on budgetary
and personnel matters to managers of units; budg-
etary flexibility to create incentives for economiz-
ing at the unit level; remuneration and promotion
of public servants more on the basis of assessed
individual performance; termination of central
agreements with public service tradesunion and
of standard, national employment conditions; the
introduction of quantifiable performance indica-
tors for public organizations; and the publication
information of performance achievements.
NPM ideas have only spread to developing coun-
tries to a limited extent, and there are major questions
about their applicability (Nunberg 1992). There is
however a range of research looking at the causes
of organizational performance in developing coun-
tries that points to the importance of a range of
other factors that can be classified as 'demand'
side. Arturo Israel's much-cited work (Israel 1987)
draws attention to the incentives to good perform-
ance that can contained in - or crafted into - the
nature of tasks. Tasks that are highly 'specific' -
clearly defined in terms of content and process,
clearly allocated to particular people and offices,
and involve quasi-automatic feedback such that
poor performance is quickly and easily detected
and publicized - tend to be performed more
effectively. More generally, there is now a large
literature that points to what may be termed 'po-
litical commitment' as a key cause of levels of
organizational performance in developing coun-
tries (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992; Goldsmith
1991; Paul 1991; Paul 1992; Tendler 1993a; Tendler
1993b). In essence, these authors conclude that
(public sector) organizations need political support
if they are to obtain resources, be listened to, and
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generally be effective. Aid agencies have been too
naive in supporting institution building in that
they have tended to ignore this issue, ending up
financially supporting organizations that may have
little clout within government (Meyer 1992).
The lesson for aid agencies is quite clear. If they
want to support organizations and institutions in
developing countries, they have to get more deeply
involved. It is not enough to supply the resources
needed. Two other things are required. One is to
pay more attention to the environment in which
institutions operate, enquiring whether there are
adequate disciplines or demands to ensure that the
organization is likely to work effectively. This im-
plies more local knowledge, which is difficult for
aid agencies given the high rate of mobility of staff
among postings. The other is simply to be more
political at all stages of the aid process: to enquire
more carefully about the likely political position of
organizations it is wishing to develop or support,
and to be willing to intervene to provide or generate
that political support where necessary.
It is for these reasons that giving aid for institution
building can become as interventionist as the politi-
cal conditionality to which it is at first sight a more
attractive alternative. Aid donors face two distinct
questions: do they wish to become interventionist
in this way? And do they have the capacity to
intervene effectively?
9 CONCLUSIONS FOR AID DONORS
Nothing said above constitutes an argument for aid
agencies to decline to become involved in institution
building activities in support of better government.
There are many things that aid agencies might try to
do to avert or minimize the problems they face.
Three in particular emerge from this article:
Aid agencies would be wise to have no truck
with the new jargon of 'capacity building', and
to insist on using language and terms that have
identifiable and precise meanings.
Effective support for institution building may
require aid agencies to be relatively political: to
pay more attention to political analysis in project
design, and to be prepared to become interventionist
in support of the projects they fund. This underlines
a point that has been made many times for a wide
range of reasons: that aid agency in-country staff
need a great deal of local knowledge and experience.
(iii) New methods of delivering technical assistance
are urgently needed. Although the conventional
'individual expert-counterpart' model has been
found seriously wanting, it will be with us for a long
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